LLM Agents Should Employ Security Principles

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LLM Advancement

Major Large Language Models (LLMs)

ranked by capabilities, sized by billion parameters used for training



Source: informationisbeautiful.net

LLM Advancement

Select AI Index Technical Performance
benchmarks vs. human performance



Source: AI Index, 2025 | Chart: 2025 AI Index report

2025 Is the Year of AI Agents



Sam Altman

We are now confident we know how to build AGI as we have traditionally understood it. We believe that, in 2025, we may see the first AI agents "join the workforce" and materially change the output of companies. We continue to believe that iteratively putting great tools in the hands of people leads to great, broadly-distributed outcomes.

Narrative 1: 2025 is the year of the AI agent

"More and better agents" are on the way, predicts Time.[1] "Autonomous 'agents' and profitability are likely to dominate the artificial intelligence agenda," reports Reuters.[2] "The age of agentic AI has arrived," promises Forbes, in response to a claim from Nvidia's Jensen Huang.[3]

Tech media is awash with assurances that our lives are on
poised to streamline and alter our jobs, drive optimization
in real time and freeing us up for creative pursuits and oth

Greg Brockman @gdb

2025 is the year of agents.

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Security Principles

J.H. Saltzer; M.D. Schroeder, 1975



The Protection of Information in Computer Systems

JEROME H. SALTZER, SENIOR MEMBER, IEEE, AND MICHAEL D. SCHROEDER, MEMBER, IEEE

Invited Paper

Abstract—This tutorial paper explores the mechanics of protecting computer-stored information from unauthorized use or modification. It concentrates on those architectural structures—whether hardware or software—that are necessary to support information protection. The paper develops in three main sections. Section I describes desired functions, design principles, and examples of elementary protection and authentication mechanisms. Any reader familiar with computers should find the first section to be reasonably accessible. Section II requires some familiarity with descriptor-based computer architecture. It examines in depth the principles of modern protection architectures and the relation between capability systems and access control list systems, and ends with a brief analysis of protected subsystems and protected objects. The reader who is dismayed by either the prerequisites or the level of detail in the second section may wish to skip to Section III, which reviews the state of the art and current research projects and provides suggestions for further reading.

GLOSSARY

THE FOLLOWING glossary provides, for reference, brief definitions for several terms as used in this paper in the context of protecting information in computers.

Access	The ability to make use of information stored in a computer system. Used frequently as a verb, to the horror of grammarians.
Access control list	A list of principals that are authorized to have access to some object.
Authenticate	To verify the identity of a person (or other agent external to the protection system) making a request.
Authorize	To grant a principal access to certain information.
Capability	In a computer system, an unforgeable ticket, which when presented can be taken as incontestable proof that the presenter is authorized to have access to the object named in the ticket.
Certify	To check the accuracy, correctness, and completeness of a security or protection mechanism.
Complete isolation	A protection system that separates principals into compartments between which no flow of information or control is possible.
Confinement	Allowing a borrowed program to have access to data, while ensuring that the program cannot release the information.
Descriptor	A protected value which is (or leads to) the physical address of some protected object.
Discretionary	(In contrast with *nondiscretionary*.) Controls on access to an object that may be changed by the creator of the object.
Domain	The set of objects that currently may be directly accessed by a principal.
Encipherment	The (usually) reversible scrambling of data according to a secret transformation key, so as to make it safe for transmission or storage in a physically unprotected environment.
Grant	To authorize (*q.v.*).
Hierarchical control	Referring to ability to change authorization, a scheme in which the record of

Manuscript received October 11, 1974; revised April 17, 1975.
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Computer Security: Art and Science
Book by Matthew Bishop, 2003



Chapter 13
Design Principles

FALSTAFF: If I had a thousand sons, the
first human principle I would teach them should
be, to forswear thin potations and to addict
themselves to sack.
—*The Second Part of King Henry the Fourth*, IV, iii, 133–136.

Specific design principles underlie the design and implementation of mechanisms for supporting security policies. These principles build on the ideas of simplicity and restriction. This chapter discusses those basic ideas and eight design principles.

Security Principles in AgentSandbox

1. **Defense-in-Depth:** Deploying multiple layers of defense, mutually reinforcing each other to minimize potential damage. *AgentSandbox* has multiple components that complement each other to offer defense-in-depth.
2. **Least Privilege:** The ephemeral agent can be provisioned with the least amount of information and privileges necessary for performing the task.
3. **Complete Mediation:** Ensuring that every access to a resource is verified before it's granted, we examine all outbound or inbound messages
4. **Psychological Acceptability:** Reducing user tuning efforts while achieving the necessary flexibility for practical and secure agent operations.

LLM Agents Should Employ Security Principles, 2025

Overview



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Illustrative Example: comparing travel agent risks



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Evaluation

Table 1: Evaluation of various defense methods under different task suites. (An upward arrow denoting the higher the better, a downward arrow denoting the lower the better.)

Tasks	Banking			Slack			Travel			Workspace		
Defenses	No Attack	With Attack		No Attack	With Attack		No Attack	With Attack		No Attack	With Attack	
	Utility↑	Utility↑	ASR↓	Utility↑	Utility↑	ASR↓	Utility↑	Utility↑	ASR↓	Utility↑	Utility↑	ASR↓
No defense	87.50%	78.47%	49.31%	95.24%	62.86%	74.29%	75.00%	55.71%	27.14%	77.50%	38.33%	26.67%
Tool filter	68.75%	65.28%	15.28%	76.19%	49.52%	6.67%	75.00%	66.43%	10.71%	65.00%	59.17%	2.92%
PI detector	37.50%	30.56%	0.00%	23.81%	15.24%	10.48%	35.00%	10.71%	0.00%	50.00%	17.50%	16.67%
Delimiting	87.50%	81.25%	36.81%	90.48%	68.57%	47.62%	60.00%	61.43%	12.86%	65.00%	54.58%	14.58%
Repeat prompt	100.00%	81.94%	32.64%	90.48%	62.86%	52.38%	65.00%	61.43%	14.29%	87.50%	67.08%	10.00%
AgentSandbox	87.50%	67.36%	5.56%	90.48%	62.86%	3.81%	80.00%	67.86%	7.14%	70.00%	62.08%	0.83%

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Evaluation



Figure 3: Evaluation of various defenses under different task suites on `gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18`.

Evaluation



Figure 4: Evaluation of various defenses under different task suites on `o3-mini-2025-01-31`.